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Abstract 
This paper argues that focusing on Aristotle’s theory of generation as primarily ‘hylomorphic’ 
can lead to difficulties. This is especially evident when interpreting the association between the 
male and sentient soul at GA II.5. If the focus is on the male’s contribution as form and the 
female’s as matter, then soul becomes divided into nutritive from female and sentient from 
male which makes little sense in Aristotle’s biological ontology. In contrast, by seeing Aristotle’s 
theory as ‘archêkinetic’, a process initiated by the male, the development of nutritive and 
sentient capacities emerges as intertwined, neither capacity originating in only one sex. 
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How do male and female contribute differently to generation according to Aristotle? 
The most general way to characterise this is in terms of matter and form. Thus, as shorthand, 
many scholars regard Aristotle’s theory to be ‘hylomorphic’.1 This paper argues that too much 
emphasis on matter and form can lead to difficulties in understanding the development of the 
nutritive and generative capacities of the soul in the embryo. This is because one prominent 
line of interpretation associates the male contribution of form with the exclusive contribution 
of sentient soul, while the female is deemed to provide nutritive soul. This conclusion stems 
 
1 ‘Reproductive hylomorphism’ was coined by Devin Henry in his PhD dissertation, ‘How to Build an 
Animal: The Metaphysics of Aristotle’s Ontogeny’, King’s College London, 2004 (see pp. 9, 89, 145, 
181n.12, 196n.29) and is taken up by many other scholars of the GA; see for example Gelber 2010, 197, 
203, 209; Stavrianeas 2018, 51-71 at 68 and even myself in Connell 2016, 301, 318.  
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from a single passage at GA II.5, 741a4-741b7.2 In this text, Aristotle focuses on the 
phenomenon of the wind egg, i.e., something produced by a female bird without a male bird.3  
In explaining why females do not generate on their own, he remarks that the male is needed 
in order for the embryo to eventually develop sentient soul (741b5-7). The hylomorphic 
analysis of this passage concludes that the male provision of sentient soul is what is meant by 
his contributing ‘form’ to generation.4 This interpretation, as will be argued more thoroughly 
in what follows, has the potential to lead to misunderstandings of Aristotle’s theory. Viewing 
the male role as an isolated ability to convey or instantiate sentient soul sits ill with 
understanding it as the efficient cause of substantial generation, ensuring that the soul is 
gradually actualised as an integrated whole. Furthermore, viewing Aristotle’s theory primarily 
in terms of the concepts ‘form’ and ‘matter’, serves to obscure, rather than illuminate, some 
of the more dynamic aspects of his account, and the complexity of the female role. Regarding 
the female contribution as solely or mainly responsible for the advent of nutritive soul confuses 
rather than elucidates its role of contributing materials capable of specific living functions, 
proper to the animal in question. These proper parts and their operations ought not to be 
separated from their role in the sentient life to come. 
The paper will proceed as follows. It will begin in Section (I) by offering an overall 
interpretative strategy to rival the hylomorphic one, which will be referred to as the 
archêkinetic framework.  It will next provide in Section (II) a brief overview of the main tenets 
of Aristotle’s reproductive theory before detailing the context and content of GA II.5, 741a4-
 
2 The content is later repeated at GA III.7, 757b14-20. 
3 It is mainly in birds that this occurs, although Aristotle notes its possibility in certain fish as well (GA III.1, 
750b27-31; III.5, 756a18-21). 
4 See especially Henry 2004; 2006; 2009; 2019. The view appears to originate in Peck’s edition of the GA 
(Aristotle 1942, xiii-xiv). 
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741b7 in Section (III).  The rival interpretation of this passage will be presented in Section (IV) 
along with the many difficulties this view creates, before concluding in Section (V) that the fact 
that it provides a more coherent reading of this passage is just one of the many advantages the 
archêkinetic has over the hylomorphic reading of Aristotle’s theory of generation.  
I. Hylomorphic versus Archêkinetic 
Many commentators hold that Aristotle has a ‘hylomorphic’ theory of generation, whereby the 
male contributes form to the female’s matter. While it cannot be denied that the generation 
of animals is an instance of form coming to be in matter, thinking of matter and form as the 
key to understanding the phenomena serves to obscure the more dynamic aspects of the 
process. In particular, Aristotle is not as concerned with the male as form giver as many modern 
commentators are; he is more keen to find that the process fits to his four-causal schema, with 
final causes directing the ends of development (GA I.1). 
There are only four passages in the Generation of Animals that associate the male role 
with form: GA I.20, 729a9-12; 1.21, 729b18-19; II.1, 732a4-5; IV.1, 765b12.5  There are several 
ways to interpret what these mean to convey to the reader. On one prominent reading, form 
is taken to be somehow present in semen and transmitted to the female contribution.6  This 
view invites oversimplification, a certain ‘form container model’, whereby form is ‘present’ or 
‘stored’ in the male semen and handed over to the female.7 Often, this thought is also added: 
 
5 Commentators tend to cite the first three plus GA II.4 738b26-8 (e.g. Henry 2009, 380, n.11). This fourth 
passage says that the body (or bulk) comes from the female and the soul from the male, and so is not 
concerned with form and matter per se, although of course in some contexts Aristotle emphasises that 
soul and form are equivalent.  
6 E.g. Pellegrin 1985; Balme 1987; Furth 1988; Cooper 1988.  
7 Furth holds that form is ‘stored’ in the semen (Furth 1988, 112); Morsink that the semen ‘carries’ the 
form (1982, 108); and Pellegrin that form is ‘present in’ semen (1985, 110). 
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that the kinêseis (‘movements’)8 present in the generative residues are ‘movements of the 
form’, like the motions of a carpenter’s tools in forming a chair and so belong only to the male.9 
This, in turn, leads to the notorious difficulty of reconciling this account of the male role with 
Aristotle’s view that hereditary influences come from both male and female sides (GA IV.3).10 
Some scholars who regard Aristotle’s theory as ‘hylomorphic’ attempt a reconciliation by 
positing that Aristotle modified his view so as to allow some contribution of form from the 
female.11 A more nuanced version of that view has it that, based on GA II.5, the male formal 
role is restricted to part of the form which is sensory soul, leaving the female to contribute the 
part of form that is nutritive soul.12 Thus, the awkwardness of all formal contributions and all 
‘movements of the form’ coming from the male is to be avoided and hereditary influences from 
the female are more easily accounted for.13   
This modification, however, comes with three key problems of its own which this paper 
will detail. First of all, it is hard to see how the soul ‘parts’ could possibly be separated into male 
 
8 The translation of this word as ‘movements’ is not always appropriate. The singular term, kinêsis, is used 
in Aristotle and in other Greek authors for the more general phenomena of change or process, of which 
motion (i.e. change in place) is only one type. Aristotle Ph. V.1, 225a34-225b9. 
9 See, e.g. Balme 1987, 312: ‘The male semen contributes nothing somatic to the fetus, but only “form” 
though the medium of “movements”.’  
10 Cooper’s implausible solution whereby the male contribution is deemed responsible for the offspring’s 
resemblance to the female’s side of the family, shows how the attractions of a hylomorphic reading often 
do not manage to outweigh its disadvantages (Cooper 1988, 30). 
11 Furth 1988; Balme 1987; Henry 2006; accepting this reading: Gotthelf 2012, 100. 
12See here especially Henry’s adoption of Peck’s reading of GA II.5 (Henry 2006, 2009). 
13 For Henry heredity is due to indirect influences, dormant until activated (Henry 2006, 291). For a similar 
account see Connell 2016, 321-4. 
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and female contributions.14 Next, it is far from clear that Aristotle ever adopts the view that 
form (in animals) is actually sensory soul. Although it is true that having sensory soul is what 
makes this living being an animal rather than a plant, its form is more than simply sensory soul 
per se. And finally, it is difficult to maintain that this is still a hylomorphic account, given that 
nutritive soul which the female supposedly solely contributes is part of an animal’s ‘form’. 
Because the interpretations in question are so attached to the idea of hylomorphism, they 
focus much of their attention in interpreting the GA in a manner that mitigates these 
difficulties.  Thus, in order to maintain a strict divide between the contributions of male and 
female in terms of form and matter, interpreters adapt their understanding of form and 
essence, to make it refer to ‘what it is to be an animal’, i.e. sentient soul only.15 And since the 
view is also that the female animal contributes only nutritive soul, a story of how that works 
must be manufactured, i.e. that the female contributes only the ‘metabolic system’ to 
offspring.16 
It is unnecessary to make these problematic modifications to Aristotle’s theory, which 
are in any case not evident in the text of the GA.  What must be done instead is to reset the 
framework of analysis, so as to begin with a summary of Aristotle’s theory of generation which 
emphasises the dynamic aspects of his account.  As a summary of Aristotle’s theory of the 
sexes’ roles in generation, hylomorphism leads to difficulties if it is not always accompanied by 
the four-causal structure which Aristotle puts in place explicitly in GA I.1 (715a3-6).17 When 
 
14 Nutritive and sentient souls are not ontologically separable when they occur in animals. This 
Aristotelian doctrine will be further examined in sections III and IV. 
15 See especially Henry 2006; 2009; 2019. This will be discussed in more detail in section V. 
16 ‘The mother contributes the part that governs the development of the metabolic system, while the 
father contributes the part that governs the development of the sensory system’ (Henry 2009, 374).  
17 Gotthelf and Falcon put it this way: ‘[for Aristotle] the male contribute[s] the form by means of his role as 
source of motion’ (Gotthelf and Falcon 2018, 21). 
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considering the content of GA II.1-3 in detail we see how careful Aristotle is to make his radical 
theory of generation seem plausible by providing a dynamic picture of embryological 
development. Aristotle never speaks of generation merely in terms of matter and form.18 
Instead, male and female are most often characterised as material and efficient causes: the 
male role is to initiate substantial change (ἢ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως; e.g. GA I.2, 716a5-7; I.21, 730a24-
30; II.1, 732a4-5, 8-9; II.4, 740b25-6; III.11, 762b3-4; IV.1, 765b14-15)19; the female is the 
material cause.  When the passages cited most often as Aristotle’s key statements of a 
‘hylomorphic’ theory are examined closely, this becomes most apparent.  The following brief 
analysis of each of these is illustrative: (1) GA I.20 729a9-12, (2) GA I.21 729b18-19 and (3) GA 
II.1 732a4-5. An additional, passage (4) GA IV.1, 765b9-14 will also be examined.20 
(1) GA I.20 729a9-12: ‘But it happens as is reasonable, since the male provides the form, 
i.e. the start of the change, and the female provides the body, i.e. the matter’21 
 
18 For this point see also Kosman 2010, 149, 154; Gelber 2010, 202; Connell 2016, ch.5; Carraro 2017, 285 
n.27. 
19 This is a point that Henry acknowledges but attempts to minimize in a footnote: ‘In other places 
Aristotle simply says that the male contributes the “starting point of change” (arkhe tes kineseos)’ (Henry 
2009, 380n.11). Henry’s book is a masterly treatment of Aristotle on substantial generation, which makes 
clear many of the dynamic aspects of his account. However, in defending ‘a hylomorphic model of 
substantial generation in all Aristotle’s work’, Henry focuses more on form and matter than on the four 
causes or potentiality and actuality, although these are taken to be crucial as well. The main disagreement 
here is not with much of this analysis of substantial generation, but with the view that male and female 
roles are the exclusive provision of different parts of soul. It is the need to keep referring to where matter 
and form come from that leads to the difficulties this paper will detail. See Henry 2019, 1-20. 
20 All translations are mine unless otherwise specified. 
21 ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει ὥσπερ εὔλογον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἄρρεν παρέχεται τό τε εἶδος καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως 
τὸ δὲ θῆλυ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ὕλην 
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This passage is often translated differently. The kai after eidos in the first part about the male 
is translated ‘and’ while the kai in the second part about the female is taken to be epexegetical 
(i.e.). I have translated both as epexegetical, which makes better sense of the parallel structure 
of the two parts of the sentence. Thus, Aristotle is seen to be explaining or qualifying the idea 
that the male provides the form; by this he means that it is the proper efficient cause of 
substantial generation.  As Physics III.2 makes plain, the efficient cause brings about the form, 
insofar as it makes the thing what it is, once the change is complete (202a7-10). But this is not 
the same thing as saying that the male imparts or conveys form to female matter or that his 
semen somehow contains form.  
(2) GA I.21 729b15-17: ‘It is not from these [male and female] that it comes to be one, 
except like a bed comes from the carpenter and the wood or a sphere from the wax 
and the form’22 
The hylomorphic interpretation relies heavily on the final phrase, which likens female and male 
to wax and its form or shape.  This is a small point, though, extracted from a much longer 
discussion with focuses on active and passive potentials (GA I.21, 729a34-729b22). In this 
context, Aristotle is challenged to explain how two components (i.e. the sexes) manage to 
create a unified result, something he is sure his parallel seed opponents cannot account for.23 
He can do so by noting that the male is the active potential and the female is the passive 
potential for substantial generation (729b9-11).  When they meet, there is then one event: the 
generation of a unified being, a new animal. We must also note that the first comparison in the 
 
22 οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τούτων τὸ γιγνόμενον ἕν, ἀλλ’ ἢ οὕτως ὡς ἐκ τοῦ τέκτονος καὶ ξύλου ἡ κλίνη ἢ ὡς ἐκ 
τοῦ κηροῦ καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ἡ σφαῖρα. 
23 ‘Further, if [the semen] is drawn from both parents alike, then two animals will come to be’ (GA I.18, 
722b8-9).  For so-called pangenesis as a ‘parallel seed theory’ see Connell 2016, ch.3. 
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passage does not convey the idea that the male contributes form to the female’s matter but 
rather that the male is like the carpenter, i.e. the efficient cause. 
(3) GA II.1 732a4-5: ‘As the first cause of change (to which belong the order and the form), 
being better and more divine by nature than the matter, it is better that the superior 
one be a separate individual from the inferior one.’24 
The context here is Aristotle’s explanation of the final cause for the separation of different 
animals into male and female tokens. Since both principles can exist within the same living 
being, as happens in plants, the purpose of their separation cannot be generation itself but 
instead comes from ‘a higher principle’, i.e. a normative metaphysical consideration.25 We can 
notice here that within the passage, and also straightaway after, the contrast between male 
and female is primarily parsed in terms of efficient and material causes (732a9). 
(4) GA IV.1, 765b9-14: ‘male and female are differentiated by a certain ability and inability; 
for the male is able to concoct and produce and to discharge seed which has the 
principle of form. I mean, by principle not ‘that from which’ such an animal comes to 
be similar to parents, like matter, but the source of change.’26 
This passage is actually very seldom cited by hylomorphic theorists; in it, Aristotle uses ‘form’ 
in association with the male role in generation.  Once again, however, form is posited only in 
the context of a dynamic account. The principle of the form does not stand alone but must be 
 
24 βελτίονος δὲ καὶ θειοτέρας τὴν φύσιν οὔσης τῆς αἰτίας τῆς κινούσης πρώτης—ᾗ ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχει  
καὶ τὸ εἶδος—τῆς ὕλης, βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κεχωρίσθαι τὸ κρεῖττον τοῦ χείρονος.  
25 For a compelling account of this see Lefebvre 2018. 
26 ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ διώρισται δυνάμει τινὶ καὶ ἀδυναμίᾳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον πέττειν 
καὶ συνιστάναι τε καὶ ἐκκρίνειν σπέρμα ἔχον τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἴδους ἄρρεν (λέγω δ’ἀρχὴν οὐ τὴν τοιαύτην 
ἐξ ἧς ὥσπερ ὕλης γίγνεται τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ γεννῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν πρώτην). 
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qualified as what begins or initiates substantial generation (tên kinousan prôtên). In this 
context, after the elaboration of his theory in GA II.1-6, Aristotle is happy to concede that the 
sort of animal the offspring is, is due, at least in part, to the materials out of which is it 
constructed.27  
The above passages cannot be interpreted as hylomorphic without qualification; all 
connect form to the efficient cause of generation. The archêkinetic framework, in contrast, 
accepts the intimate connection between efficient causation and form.  The male role is 
connected to the form of a new animal because the father (or a tool of the father’s nutritive 
soul, the semen)28 is the proper efficient cause, ensuring the advent of another animal like in 
form to the parents.29 But, note, this is not the same thing as saying that Aristotle’s theory of 
generation can be summarised, in brief, as the male supplying the form and the female the 
matter.  Although it is correct to say that the male does not contribute matter (GA I.21, 729b18-
20), it is not quite right to say that the female has nothing to do with the form that comes to 
be in the new animal. In order to produce a new animal, the same in form as the male, mating 
must occur with a female the same in form. This is shown most clearly in the case of hybrid 
animals; when the female animal is not the same in form as the male animal, then generation 
to type fails; the new animal is not a horse or a dog or any kind: it is a deformity that displays 
characteristics midway between the parent’s bodily structures.30 Rather than saying that the 
form exists in the semen and is conveyed by the father (the ‘form-container’ model), it is better 
think of generation in terms of active and passive potentials. The female has the passive and 
 
27 In rejecting the view that development occurs due to a principle that ‘like makes way to like’, he notes 
that the parts are formed in the embryo ‘because the residue of the female is potentially the same as the 
nature of the [new] animal’ (GA II.6, 740b19-20).  
28 GA II.1, 734b8-9. 
29 For a more thorough analysis see Connell 2016, ch.5.1. 
30 GA II.4, 738b30-31.  
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the male the active potential to generate (GA I.20, 729a24-31; II.4, 740b22-25; Metaph. IX.1, 
1046a19-26; Ph. III.3, 202a13-19) and this means that as active agent, similar to the craftsman, 
the male is the cause (of the advent of form) properly speaking. This is because he (sometimes 
through tools) is the active agent of generation.31 This means that the difference between the 
contributions of the two sexes is not the static – ‘provides form’, ‘does not provide form’ – but 
the more dynamic, ‘is able to generate’ versus ‘is not able to generate’ (GA I.21, 730a29-30; 
II.5, 741b3-4; III.1, 750b27-9; III.5, 755b5).32 The following reading of the Generation of Animals, 
and in particular Book II, chapter 5, shows the advantages of this archêkinetic framework of 
interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of generation.33 
II. Preliminaries: Aristotle’s theory of sperma as a residue  
In order to get a sense of what Aristotle is concerned about in GA II.5, it is necessary to place it 
within the context of the tasks occupying him in GA II.1-6. Towards the end of GA II.1, Aristotle 
 
31 Aristotle often refers to the male (or his tools) as the demiourgos -- ‘maker’ (e.g. GA I.18, 723b2-3; 
723b30; II.4, 738b21; GA IV.4, 771b22). The first two passages refer to the nutri-generative soul as the 
maker, the last two assign this to the male animal’s action in generation – it is, as we will see, only his 
nutri-generative soul (and not the female’s) that is fully functional. 
32 Aristotle often expresses the view that what it is to be male is to achieve or complete generation while 
what it is to be female is to be unable to do so without the male (GA I.21, 730a29-30, II.5, 741b3-4, III.1, 
750b27-9, III.5, 755b5).  This can also be parsed in terms of the female being unable to complete the 
concoction of semen, e.g. GA I.20, 728a18-19, II.3, 737a29, IV.1, 765b9-16. 
33 Gotthelf’s emphasis on the ‘potential for form’ in Aristotle’s theory of generation is closer to the 
archêkinetic perspective: ‘the father, as ultimate efficient cause, acts on the material supplied by the 
mother….which initiates a process leading in normal circumstances to the production of an offspring one 
in form with the father’. Gotthelf also finds it necessary, however, to accept the Peck-Henry reading of 
GA II.5 to mean that the female contributes to ‘the formal side of generation’ (Gotthelf 2012, 97, 100). 
See also Gotthelf and Falcon 2018, 26: ‘the male supplies the perceptive soul’. 
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begins to pose a number of challenges (or aporiai) for his radical new theory of generation 
proposed in GA I. In that book, after setting out certain methodological principles, Aristotle 
completes a survey of the generative parts. He begins with the non-uniform parts and promises 
an account of the uniform ones; it is only at the end of GA I.16 that he starts what will be his 
own theory of generation, by elucidating what he posits at first to be a uniform part: sperma 
(seed). Sperma is the origin of the new animal; the new animal comes to be from sperma and 
sperma comes to be from the parents (GA I.1, 716a8-14). Sperma is no ordinary part; instead, 
it is a portion (meros) of the useful residue of nourishment (GA I.18, 725a11). The final 
nourishment (i.e. blood) is used to make up and maintain the adult’s living body but an animal 
that is fully grown and reasonably well fed will have a little bit of this left over (i.e. residual).  
Although they are different (GA I.18, 724a36-724b8), the nutritive origins of female sperma are 
the same as that of the male variety. The difference between them is slight, i.e. degree of 
concoction, the female sperma is less concocted (GA I.20, 26-27, IV.1, 765b35-766a3).  With 
this small difference, Aristotle is able to put in place his differentiated seed hypothesis; the 
male acts as an agent only, being the efficient cause of substantial generation, while the female 
supplies specialised materials which are potentially like the body of the new animal (GA I.20, 
729a27-8; I.21, 729a34-729b9; 730a24-28).34   
GA II takes up this theory but with the challenge of explaining how it is that the male 
does not contribute anything material to generation but rather ‘a certain potential and [source 
of] change’ (I.21, 729b6).35 The difficulties Aristotle presents in GA II.1-5 mostly relate to the 
male role. How can something that does not contribute any matter influence the offspring (GA 
 
34 For the idea of Aristotle’s view as a ‘differentiated seed hypothesis’ see Connell 2016, ch. 3. 
35 After an initial section on the normative basis of sex difference and how different methods of 
generation relate to body heat, Aristotle focuses back on his new theory and posits a series of ‘problems’ 
(aporiai) for it (GA II.1, 733b23-5, 733b31-734a2, 734a17; II.3, 736a31-2). 
12 
 
II.1, 733b24734a16)? What happens to the bodily semen (II.3, 736a26)? How is semen (gonê) 
related to the soul of the new animal (II.3, 736a28-33)? The theory of seed as a residue is not 
initially that helpful in supporting the unique role of the male. First of all, both male and female 
seeds are residues, so the male seed’s status as a residue does not explain this interesting new 
non-material role.36 Next, that the ‘most useful’ residue ‘is the last from which come to be each 
of the parts [of the body]’ (725a11-13) is a description that best applies not to the male but to 
the female contribution which will become the body of the new animal (GA II.5, 741b7, II.6, 
738b26). Thus, Aristotle continues to battle with the problem of how the male can bring about 
the changes that will make a new animal develop without contributing any physical part to it.  
These problems are aided by Aristotle’s earlier analogy of generation to a mechanical puppet 
(GA II.1, 734b4-17): gradual foetal development is like the sequential interconnected spatial 
movements of the puppet, started by one initial push or trigger (II.5, 741b8-9).37 This is how 
the male is able to be the source of substantial change, by starting what has within it the 
capacity to react according to a set pattern. This account highlights the importance of the 
materials supplied by the female. These materials are highly specialised, containing 
(potentially) all the parts and the whole body of an animal the same in form as the female (II.6, 
738b7-9, 740b19-21). Putting all that together in the first part of GA II, it is unsurprising that 
another potential difficulty arises – why, given that the female has this special material, ready 
to become the living body of the offspring, and a place for gestation to occur, does it not 
 
36 That the male contributes no material is Aristotle’s great innovation in reproductive theory (GA I.21, 
729b18-20). He shares views about the origins of the generative contributions with various Presocratic 
and Hippocratic authors: see especially Louguet 2015. 
37 There is no good reason to take the changes in the foetus to be local motions; the puppet is an analogy 
and no literal similarity is implied. For a fuller account of the automatic puppet as a solution to the puzzle 
of male agency, see Lefebvre forthcoming. 
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generate all on its own (GA II.5, 741a4-9)? It is in the context of trying to solve that puzzle, that 
Aristotle makes his remarks about the male’s close association with sentient soul, the passage 
to which we now turn. 
14 
 
III. The passage from GA II 5  
As Aristotle begins to make clear already in GA I, the differentiation of the sexes is in terms of 
the ultimate ability to generate another (I.20, 728a17-21). However, he also recognises that 
the female, as he puts it, can ‘generate up to a point’ (I.21-22, 730a30-33). But it cannot start 
the generation of an animal in earnest without a male principle (I.21, 730a28-30; II.3, 
737a34).38  This problem returns once again to occupy Aristotle in GA II.5. In order to make 
sense of his statement about sentient soul it is important to look at the passage from the very 
beginning of GA II.5 up to 741a29. I will take this in two sections, and discuss each separately 
(A) 741a6-18; (B) 741a18-29. I will then discuss (C) 741a33-741b9, where the lines ‘the male 
imparts (empoiein) the sentient soul’ occur (741b6). 
(A) GA II.5, 741a6-29: (1) If the female has the same soul and the matter is the residue of 
the female, why is the male required in addition? Why doesn’t the female generate by 
itself from itself?  (2) The reason is that an animal differs from a plant through 
sensation.  It is impossible without the presence of sentient soul for a face or hand or 
flesh or any other part [of an animal to exist] either actually or potentially, whether in 
some way or absolutely so.  For that will be like a corpse or a dead part. (3) So if the 
male is the active agent of this type of soul, where male and female are separated, the 
female is unable by itself to generate an animal from itself.  For it was said that this is 
what it is to be male.  (4) However, it is reasonable to be puzzled, as it is clear in those 
wind eggs generated in birds that the female is able to generate up to a point.39 
 
38 Animals that generate on their own are normally hermaphrodites like bees (GA III.10). 
39 εἴπερ ἔχει τὸ θῆλυ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἡ ὕλη τὸ περίττωμα τὸ τοῦ θήλεός ἐστι, τί προσδεῖται 
τοῦ ἄρρενος ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτὸ ἐξ αὑτοῦ γεννᾷ τὸ θῆλυ; αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι διαφέρει τὸ ζῷον τοῦ φυτοῦ 
αἰσθήσει· ἀδύνατον δὲ πρόσωπον ἢ χεῖρα ἢ σάρκα εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο τι μόριον μὴ ἐνούσης 
αἰσθητικῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ δυνάμει καὶ ἤ πῃ ἢ ἁπλῶς· ἔσται γὰρ οἷον νεκρὸς ἢ νεκροῦ 
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Peck’s interpretation of this passage, reflected in his translation of (3), is that (2) is giving the 
reason why females cannot generate by themselves which (3) then elaborates.  
Peck’s translation of (3) is as follows: 
(3) ‘Thus, if the male is the factor which produces the sentient Soul in cases where male 
and female are separate, it is impossible for the female all by itself and from itself to 
generate an animal: because the faculty just mentioned [footnote: The production of 
sentient soul] is the essence of what is meant by “male”’40 
One can first contest the assumption in Peck’s reading that (2) is a complete answer to (1) and 
then that (3) is some kind of elaboration of (1) which marks a modification of his earlier view 
of female generative infirmity. On the Peck hypothesis, rather than implying here, as he did 
before on numerous occasions that the female is defective and ungenerative, Aristotle is saying 
that females have the ability to generate nutritive soul but not sentient soul. This reading then 
leads to the conclusion that the ability to generate sentient soul (and sentient soul only) is what 
 
μόριον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ποιητικὸν ψυχῆς, ὅπου κεχώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ 
ἄρρεν ἀδύνατον τὸ θῆλυ αὐτὸ ἐξ αὑτοῦ γεννᾶν ζῷον· τὸ γὰρ εἰρημένον ἦν τὸ ἄρρεν εἶναι· ἐπεὶ 
ὅτι γ’ ἔχει λόγον ἡ λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρνίθων τῶν τὰ ὑπηνέμια τικτόντων ὅτι 
δύναται μέχρι γέ τινος τὸ θῆλυ γεννᾶν. 
40 Peck introduces the idea that the male contributes only sentient soul. This is not in the Greek and is 
not suggested in previous translations. One can look, for example, to Arthur Platt’s translation, reprinted 
in Aristotle 1984, 1150: (3) ‘Thus if it is the male that has the power of making the sensitive soul, then 
where the sexes are separated it is impossible for the female to generate an animal from itself alone, for 
the process in question was what being male is.’ This does not indicate that the male only generates 




it is to be male, the essence of maleness.41 This argument has a logical structure. However, one 
can see it as unsound on Aristotelian grounds. The premises that are adopted in this 
interpretation clash with the views he espouses elsewhere in the GA, in particular these three 
points (i) that the females cannot generate because they lack sentient soul, (ii) that the soul 
capacities can be divided between the contributions of male and female and, finally, (iii) that 
sentience is what it is to be male. None of these are usually held by Aristotle and, furthermore, 
there is no evidence in the rest of the GA that he has changed his mind and is now incorporating 
these three theses into his theory of generation. We will return later to these ideas, suggested 
by the Peck translation, which have become more entrenched as an interpretation of this 
passage.42 
In interpreting the passage above, there is a more viable alternative which fits with 
Aristotle’s views expressed elsewhere in the GA and in other works. Let’s first consider the 
import of (2): as a reason for (1), it is inadequate on its own and invites us to consider the 
possibility of non-explicit assumptions. Aristotle is pointing out that none of the parts of an 
animal can develop if there is no sentient soul present from the outset (e.g. at GA II.1, 735a6-
9); the heart, once it becomes the locus of development, must be the first actualisation of 
sentient soul – no plant has a heart. Plants only have nutritive soul and so can grow immediately 
once the material is present, which is why they can grow from cuttings (i.e. materials that are 
potentially like the same plant).43 But Aristotle is not here separating nutritive from sentient 
 
41 In all of this, Peck is closely followed by Henry, 2006, 2009 as will be explained in more detail in section 
V. 
42 (ii) and (iii) are addressed in (b) and (c) of Section IV. (i) is addressed in the discussion of (B) that follows 
in this section.  
43 Plants do not have the same spatial organisation and patterns of growth as animals do. They will 
nourish indiscriminately and grow in all directions (DA II.2, 413a28-30). Some look to Aristotle’s 
description of wind eggs in GA III to support the idea that the female contributes actual nutritive soul. 
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functions. He is adamant in DA that they are ontologically inseparable in animals (DA II.3, 
415a1-2, Cf. PA II.1, 647a25-27; Somn. 455b34ff.), a point to which we will return shortly. (3) is 
of course related to (2) but not as an elaboration of any argument but as a better and more 
complete answer to (1). (3) is going back to GA I on the differentiation of male and female roles 
in generation. The male is the active agent bringing about the generation of an animal which 
has a combined nutritive and sentient soul. Aristotle doesn’t say ‘sentient soul’ but ‘this sort of 
soul’ (741a13-14 τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ποιητικὸν ψυχῆς), i.e. an animal soul, with both nutritive and 
sentient faculties combined in one soul. This is the sort of soul the female cannot generate. He 
then states that this is what it is to be male, i.e. the definition of male. If this were a new 
definition of male, which redefined it as what was about to produce or implant sentient soul 
only, then why would Aristotle say ‘as has been said before’? If we go back to previous 
definitions of male in the text, these all relate to agency in generation – the ability to generate, 
being like the carpenter, etc.44 And so it is best to conclude that this is what he is referring to 
here as well. The male is that which is able to initiate the generation of a new animal of the 
same sort, i.e. with the same sort of soul, as the parents. Furthermore, it cannot make sense 
for ‘what it is to be male’ (741a9-10) to be the contribution of sentient soul only, given that 
 
There Aristotle remarks that ‘the [wind] egg itself regarded as the fetation of a plant is complete (teleion), 
but regarded as the fetation of an animal is incomplete (ateles)’ (III.7, 757b19). The first phrase cannot 
mean that the female wind egg is a plant fetus because it could only make an animal; animals do not 
make plants. It must be taken counterfactually, i.e. ‘if the living being were a plant, then this fetation 
would be a complete one’ but since this female bird is not a plant, its fetation cannot be complete. The 
nutritive soul is not yet activated; it is not drawing nourishment to itself and digesting it. 
44 GA I.2 says what it is to be male is to possess the principle of [substantial] change and generation 
(716a5-6; cf. IV.1, 765b14-15). GA II.4 defines the male as a ‘maker’ (dêmiourgos) (738b21), which is the 
same term used to identify the male at III.2, 762b3-4. On Aristotle’s definition of male (in 
contradistinction from female) see also note 32 above. 
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there is a male principle in plants,45 and no plant has sentient soul. It must mean that the male 
is the efficient cause of substantial generation, the active agent of this change, as was 
established in GA I (i.e. ‘as has been said before’). 
The question that Aristotle does not answer explicitly here, but is available from what 
we have already gathered in GA I, is why the female, even though it has in some sense ‘the 
same soul’ as the male cannot generate on its own.  The answer is simply that the female being 
weaker and colder cannot produce internal nourishment in its final form. Only the male seed 
can initiate generation.46   
Being a residue, sperma is being changed by the same change as that by which the 
body grows through distribution of the final nourishment, when it enters the uterus it 
sets and changes the residue of the female by the same change which it itself happens 
to be changed by.  For [the female matter] is a residue, and it has all the parts in it 
potentially, none in actuality…. For the female is like a deformed male, and the 
menstrual fluid is sperma, but impure.  For it does not have only one thing -- the 
principle/start of soul (τὸ γὰρ θῆλυ ὥσπερ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ πεπηρωμένον καὶ τὰ καταμήνια 
σπέρμα, οὐ καθαρὸν δέ· ἓν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει μόνον· τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχήν, 737a18-30). 
The female is not said to lack the form or the ability to contribute sentient soul; it is said to lack 
precisely what the male is defined in terms of – i.e. the ability to start off the generation of a 
new animal. It is female because it lacks what it is to be male.   
So why might commentators think that there has been a modification of the theory of male 
and female contributions? One reason is what Aristotle ends up saying about the wind-egg 
phenomenon, which some interpret to mean that the female contributes only nutritive soul; 
 
45 All sublunary life shares in male and female – GA 1.23, 731a24-33; I.1, 732a12-14. 




this then serves as a fitting counterpoint to the male contributing only sentient soul.  A certain 
interpretation of (B) reinforces this dichotomy, so let’s consider its import now. 
(B) GA II.5, 741a18-29: (4) However, it is reasonable to be puzzled, as it is clear in those 
wind eggs generated in birds that the female is able to generate up to a point.  (5) 
Further, there is this puzzle: in what sense are these eggs said to live? For they are not 
like fertilised eggs (for what comes to be from these are actually ensouled) but neither 
are they like wood or stone.  For these eggs rot so that before that, they were in a 
certain manner living.  It is clear that they have some sort of potential soul. But which 
sort? It must be the least, i.e. the nutritive sort.  This is present in all animals and plants 
alike.  (6) Why are the parts and the animal not completed? Because they need to have 
sentient soul [because a male wasn’t involved], for the parts of the animal are not like 
those of the plant. Because of this, the male must share [the work]. For in these [i.e. 
animals] the male is separate.47 
This second portion of the passage begins to answer to the initial question, i.e. (1) ‘If the female 
has the same soul and the matter is the residue of the female, why is the male required in 
addition? Why doesn’t the female generate by itself from itself?’ This question arises because 
the female has the ‘same soul’ as the male. They are the same in form (GA I.23, 730b34, 
 
47 τὸ γὰρ εἰρημένον ἦν τὸ ἄρρεν εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γ’ ἔχει λόγον ἡ λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν 
ὀρνίθων τῶν τὰ ὑπηνέμια τικτόντων ὅτι δύναται μέχρι γέ τινος τὸ θῆλυ γεννᾶν.  ἔτι δ’ ἔχει καὶ τοῦτο 
ἀπορίαν πῶς τις αὐτῶν τὰ ᾠὰ φήσει ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ οὕτως ὡς τὰ γόνιμα ᾠὰ ἐνδέχεται (ἐγίγνετο γὰρ ἂν 
ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐνεργείᾳ ἔμψυχον) οὔθ’ οὕτως ὥσπερ ξύλον ἢ λίθος. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τούτων τῶν ᾠῶν φθορά τις 
ὡς μετεχόντων τρόπον τινὰ ζωῆς πρότερον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἔχει τινὰ δυνάμει ψυχήν. ποίαν οὖν ταύτην; 
ἀνάγκη δὴ τὴν ἐσχάτην. αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ θρεπτική· αὕτη γὰρ ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς. 
διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀποτελεῖ τὰ μόρια καὶ τὸ ζῷον; ὅτι δεῖ αἰσθητικὴν αὐτὰ ἔχειν ψυχήν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὥσπερ 
φυτοῦ τὰ μόρια τῶν ζῴων. διὸ δεῖται τῆς τοῦ ἄρρενος κοινωνίας· κεχώρισται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τὸ ἄρρεν. 
20 
 
Metaph. I.9); and form is soul (DA II.1, 412a20). The nutritive soul strives to make another 
animal like itself (II.4, 415a22-415b7), so why wouldn’t the female, which clearly has a nutritive 
soul (and the materials needed for the foetal body), do this on its own? 48 Section (C) completes 
Aristotle’s answer. 
(C) GA II.5, 741a32-741b7: (7) If there is a genus which is female without having a separate 
male, it can generate a new animal from itself. This has not been reliably observed up 
to now; some sorts of fish are a cause of doubt. For amongst the so-called erythrinus 
no male has been so far observed, but females full of fetations have. Although these 
have not been reliably observed, some fish types have neither male nor female, such 
as eels and a certain sort of kestreos which lives in marshland rivers. (8) In animals 
where male and female are separate, it is not possible for the female to generate from 
itself by itself to completion. For the male would be in vain, and nature does nothing 
in vain. Therefore, in these sorts, the male always completes generation. (9) For it 
imparts/causes sentient soul, either through itself or through semen.49 
 
48 Pellegrin thinks it odd that Aristotle did not ask why the male cannot generate on its own (Pellegrin 
2018, 87). But this query cannot get off the ground; because the male role is immaterial, it could never 
make another sublunary living being on its own. If the male were to supply its own blood or residues as 
the matter for the new animal, then that would be the female role – it would be female as well as male, 
i.e. a hermaphrodite.  
49 Εἰ δ’ ἐστί τι γένος ὃ θῆλυ μέν ἐστιν, ἄρρεν δὲ μὴ ἔχει κεχωρισμένον, ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο ζῷον ἐξ αὑτοῦ 
γεννᾶν ὅπερ ἀξιοπίστως μὲν οὐ συνῶπται μέχρι γε τοῦ νῦν, ποιεῖ δὲ διστάζειν ἐν τῷ γένει τῷ τῶν ἰχθύων· 
τῶν γὰρ καλουμένων ἐρυθρίνων ἄρρην μὲν οὐθεὶς ὦπταί πω, θήλειαι δὲ καὶ κυημάτων πλήρεις. ἀλλὰ 
τούτων μὲν οὔπω πεῖραν ἔχομεν ἀξιόπιστον· οὔτε δὲ θήλεα οὔτε ἄρρενα καὶ ἐν τῷ τῶν ἰχθύων γένει 
ἐστίν, οἷον αἵ τ’ ἐγχέλεις καὶ γένος τι κεστρέων περὶ τοὺς τελματιαίους ποταμούς. ἐν ὅσοις δὲ κεχώρισται 
τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ τὸ θῆλυ γεννᾶν εἰς τέλος· τὸ γὰρ ἄρρεν μάτην ἂν ἦν, ἡ 
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Aristotle attempts both theoretical and empirical answers to the worry about parthenogenesis. 
The brief, and perhaps somewhat unconvincing, theoretical reply is that if females could 
generate on their own, there would be no need for males, and ‘nature does nothing in vain’ 
(8). Even if we accept this axiom, it does not guarantee that females cannot generate on their 
own. This is because nature often works to make situations better or easier for species;50 thus 
there is nothing to stop the inference that females can generate on their own, it is just that 
males make it better or easier for them to do so.51 Thus Aristotle focuses on empirical 
observations.  Initially he broadens the worry to certain animals that seem to be only female 
(741a33-37). Of this there has been no ‘trustworthy’ (ἀξιόπιστον) observation.52 If anyone has 
taken note of this phenomenon it is the only great observational zoologist of this time period, 
i.e. Aristotle himself; his opponents do not concentrate on such obscure and rare sighting. 
What is far more threatening to his case is something extremely common and well-known, i.e. 
unfertilised eggs, or ‘wind-eggs’, which is why he spends so much time on them here.  Wind 
eggs, conveniently, appear in kinds which have obvious male and female tokens (8).  In these 
animals, he says, females cannot generate without the male.53 Earlier the empirical point 
 
δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν ποιεῖ μάτην. διόπερ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀεὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ἐπιτελεῖ τὴν γένεσιν. ἐμποιεῖ γὰρ 
τοῦτο τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ψυχὴν ἢ δι’ αὑτοῦ ἢ διὰ τῆς γονῆς. 
50 GA I.4, 717a15-16: ‘nature does everything either because it is necessary or because it is better’. For 
an account of luxury parts see Leunissen 2010, 33 and Sec. 3.2. 
51 This is how Aristotle understands the female orgasm – generation can occur without it, but it opens up 
the uterus and so makes for easier conception (GA II.4 739a29-34).  
52 See also GA III.7, 757b22-24. 
53 In fact, the empirical case is not that straightforward. Aristotle has a lot of difficulty finding copulation 
in some sorts of animal, for example, fish. He concludes that they are so quick about it, that they avoid 
observation (GA III.5, 756a36-756b3). 
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(reinforced again at 741a30-33) was made that females are not found to generate when males 
have not been involved.  So, wind eggs are female-only products but they are ungenerative. 
Wind eggs are not uniform but have a crude differentiation into white and yolk. For 
Aristotle, the white of the egg is closer to form and ‘contains in itself the soul heat’ (GA III.1, 
752a2). He insists it is ‘not due to the male and the female, the white being male and the yolk 
female: both are from the female’ (751b26-7). The first time wind eggs are mentioned is in GA 
I in conjunction with an empirical proof of the male role as ‘maker’ or active agent of 
generation: if a wind egg has not yet been differentiated into white and yolk, and copulation 
occurs, it will become fertile (I.21, 730a5-8). However, this not only shows that males are 
required to produce fertile eggs that develop into animals but also that the female can 
‘generate up to a point’ without the male (I.21-22, 730a30-34). As with many other topics left 
hanging in GA I, Aristotle takes up a fuller exposition of it in GA II.  This passage (4-6), then, 
answers any remaining worries. In GA I, the male action is to ‘set’ (sunistami) the embryo at 
conception. Supposedly, this is how rennet (I.21, 729b6) acts on milk in the cheese-making 
process, by integrating the homogenous stuff (παραπλήσιον ποιούσης) (GA I.21, 729b31, I.22, 
730b3, I.23, 731a16, II.1, 733b21, II.3, 737a21, II.4, 739a8, 739b21-4).54  It might seem that 
when the male animal ‘sets’ the female contribution (and when the female can occasionally do 
this itself), since this is likened to making cheese, then the outcome would be a solidified mass. 
However, this cannot be accurate. The limitations of the analogy become much clearer later on 
in the GA when more than one offspring is produced at one time (GA IV.4, 771a17-771b14). 
This cannot be like cheese-making, since more milk and rennet never result in lots of little 
cheeses coming to be, but instead simply one large homogeneous mass. And this is precisely 
what does not happen in animal generation, since each embryo has a fixed size based on its 
 
54 It can make many of these parcels at once if the animal is multiparous (GA I.20, 729a4-14). 
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essence (771b33-772a4).55 Already in GA I-II the analogy is shown to be imperfect: this is 
because only minimal, localised solidification occurs in an embryo, unlike in a cheese. Most of 
the new foetus or egg must remain liquid, as this is how it remains potentially like any body 
part before these begin to be differentiated and solidified in different ways.56 If it were to 
become solid, it could not begin to develop. There will be semi solidification in the formation 
of a membrane, which is one of the first things to form around the living being.57 In the case of 
the egg, there will also be internal membranes which separate the white from the yolk. If this 
sort of solidification occurs before the male has any input, then this is the end of any potential 
to become an animal. 
The crude differentiation into white and yolk does not indicate that there could be any 
living being here – there is no activation of nutritive soul; the wind egg is nowhere near being 
able to feed and nourish itself.58 One cannot easily infer from this thought that the female must 
contribute the nutritive soul and the male the sentient soul. First of all, the female cannot 
activate the nutritive soul; this was made clear in GA I and remains central to the account in 
 
55 For an analysis of how multiparity works see Connell 2018. 
56 This is very clear in Aristotle’s embryogenetic story – the heart is the first part to be formed and 
actualised – it directs the development of the other parts, which are formed out of liquid, i.e. the final 
nourishment, blood or its analogue, using the tools of hot, cold, wet and dry which create different 
qualities of solidified uniform parts (GA II.6, 743a2-743b25).  
57 Aristotle makes the reader particularly aware of this in his discussion of how the foetus gains 
nourishment in the uterus or egg. Some posit that foetuses suck on bits of flesh but Aristotle is adamant 
that this is impossible because it is surrounded by membranes from the outset (GA II.7, 746a1, a23-26). 
58 Wind eggs have no soul functions (e.g. GA I.21, 730a30, II.3, II.5, 737a30, 741b6, III.1, 750b9f.; see also 
uterine moles, GA VI.7). They cannot nourish themselves, and so it cannot be the case that they have 
actualised nutritive soul (GA II.3, 736b10-11). For the view that the wind egg’s nutritive soul is never 
actualised see Gelber 2010, 200. 
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GA II, where we discover that the formation of the heart in the early fertilised embryo is due 
to the male action.59 Thus, the nutritive and sentient soul, which are together and ontologically 
inseparable in animals, are actualised only after the male contribution comes together with the 
female contribution. That the male completes generation is already clear in the initial 
definitions of male and female. Female needs male to generate; male ensures the whole soul 
is activated, including sentient capacities, which will make it the animal it is to be. But Aristotle 
does not here say or imply that that male or his contribution only activates that part of soul.  
The wind egg is an odd phenomenon; it is a manifestation of what happens to the 
female contribution when generation fails to take place which would normally be invisible. The 
failure of male and female contributions to meet at the right time, leave the female 
contribution over-ripe, i.e. going beyond the capacity to be fertilised. Aristotle makes this clear 
already in GA I and reinforces this point in GA III – the egg can only become fertile if copulation 
occurs before the white and yolk have separated (I.20 I.21, 730a730a5-8; III.7, 757b6-8). After 
that, it is beyond any hope (GA III.7, 757b1-2). Thus, the wind egg is not equivalent to the 
female contribution to generation. This is important because when Aristotle says the wind egg 
has the lowest portion of soul potentially (5), he is not here speaking about the female 
contribution to generation; he is not redefining the contributions of male and female. It is the 
wind egg in particular he is worrying about; it is the wind egg that has the nutritive soul only 
 
59 GA II.4, 740a2-4: ‘[T]he heart is the first part to be distinguished in actuality (ἀποκρίνεται πρῶτον ἡ 
καρδία ἐνεργείᾳ). Once the heart is in place, the embryo has, in a sense, an actualised nutritive soul (GA 
II.1, 735a12-18; II.4, 740a5). In another sense, its nutritive soul is not properly actualised until after its 
birth, when it can locomote and attain its own food in the way that is natural to it as the sort of animal it 
is. For an interesting analysis of Aristotelian embryology along these lines, see Carraro 2017, 289-90.  For 
the importance of the way in which animals acquire food see e.g. HA I.1, 487a14-487b8; for the effect of 




because it has been thwarted and is a dead-end product – it can never become an animal.60 
The female contribution, in contrast, has nutritive and sentient soul (together) potentially – 
because it has the potential to become an animal when it still has the chance of meeting with 
the male contribution. 
IV. The Peck-Henry Interpretation: Form Means Sentient Soul 
It was Arthur Peck, in his 1942 English translation with introduction and notes, who first posited 
that GA II.5 was a new theory of the contributions of male and female to generation. As Peck 
put it:  ‘the meaning of the statement that “the male supplies the Form” can only be that the 
male supplies that part of the Form known as sentient Soul; everything else, including nutritive 
Soul, can be supplied by the female… the only difference between them is that the male’s 
contribution possesses also sentient Soul potentially’ (Peck, Aristotle, xiii-xiv). The way that 
Peck translates the passage shows how he understood the argument to go. For him, (2) is the 
solution to the puzzle of (1), and (3) an elaboration of this. Thus, the question of why the female 
cannot generate on its own is that it cannot contribute sentient soul (interpretation of 2) and 
that’s because only the male can do this (interpretation of 3). The female, instead, contributes 
nutritive soul (interpretation of 4-6) and the male sentient soul only (9). This understanding of 
(1)-(6) and (9) is then taken to be a modification of the theory of the contributions of the sexes 
that has appeared so far in the treatise. For Peck (and others) this is primarily to be 
characterised in terms of matter and form. The male supplies the form, the female the matter. 
(1)-(6) and (9) then must be a modification of this, such that the male supplies the part or 
version of form that is sentient soul.  Devin Henry takes up this view and provides a detailed 
 
60 See also De Ribera-Martin 2019, 119-120. It is puzzling, though, that Aristotle gives the wind egg 
potential nutritive soul when this can never be actualised. It appears that he is struggling to describe the 
process that the egg undergoes on its own and reaches for the nearest equivalent: it is in some sense like 
the seed of a mere plant. 
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account of what he takes to be the gradual refinement of the hylomorphic theory from GA I.17 
to GA II.5.61 Henry posits first that there are two ways in which the male contributes form. The 
first occurs at end of GA I (near the passages listed above which mention ‘form’): when the 
male semen sets the menses, it ‘forms’ them (from a liquid to a solid mass). This, however is 
not the ‘male’s exclusive contribution’, since the female can produce wind eggs, which show 
that the female can set offspring too (I.21-22, 730a30-33).62 The second version comes in GA 
II.4-5: the female contributes the body; the male, the soul.63 The male does not, however, 
contribute the whole soul but only the sensory soul (GA II.5).  
‘[W]hen we turn to GA II 5 we discover that this body/soul hylomorphism does not actually 
apply to the offspring’s entire soul but only a certain part of it. In the final analysis, what 
 
61 Balme also thinks that Aristotle is putting forward a view here that is distinct from that which he 
expresses earlier about the male role.  However, he is more cautious, commenting that ‘when Aristotle 
considers how unfertilized eggs can come about…, he concludes that the female material itself also has 
nutritive soul potentially; but until it receives perceptive soul from the male it cannot develop animal 
parts…Otherwise Aristotle usually speaks as he does here: the male contributes the source of soul, 
including nutritive’ (in his Aristotle, comments on 737a33, p.165). 
62 Henry 2006, 293-5; 2009, 373; 2019, ch.5. 
63 The passage in GA II 4, 738b25-739a2 appears to be doing different work than simply clarifying form 
and matter in generation. Here Aristotle is offering another answer to the challenge that males have to 
contribute material to generation (GA II.3, 736a27-29), something he is still concerned to refute and 
which will also help him to explain how some male animals have no semen at all (738b12). The passage 
is therefore not designed to refine his hylomorphic hypothesis but to show that males do not have to 
contribute materials to generation – because the body or bulk (soma) comes from the female, a point 
reinforced by a reference to hybrids whose bodies are like their female parents (738b27-36). In any case, 
the idea of male contributing soul and female body complicates hylomorphism since these are even more 
difficult to separate ontologically or conceptually than form and matter. For that latter problem see 
especially Connell 2016, 155-156 and Carraro 2017. 
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the male alone is said to provide is the offspring’s sensory soul… This is what Aristotle 
ultimately means when he says that the father’s exclusive contribution to the generation 
of an animal is its form’ (Henry 2006, 295). 
 
The hylomorphic framework now requires that some account be given of how sensory soul is 
the form. Henry writes: ‘For the sensory soul is the form of an animal in the most strict sense: 
it is the property that makes a creature an animal (its substantial being)’ (ibid).64 It is then 
claimed that this account provides a way to keep the theory hylomorphic while avoiding the 
difficulties of making sense of hereditary resemblance. The idea that the father provides 
sensory soul ‘does not conflict with the view that the mother supplies movements that account 
for hereditary resemblance’ (ibid.). 
Even if this revised reproductive hylomorphism were to avoid a conflict between 
hylomorphism and the account of hereditary resemblance in GA IV.3, it creates other 
difficulties of its own in terms of fitting with Aristotle’s philosophy.65 These can be listed in short 
as follows: 
(a) It is difficult to imagine in what sense nutritive and sentient soul could be separated 
into male and female contributions 
 
64 Both of the above points are repeated almost verbatim in Henry 2009, 373.  
65 The Peck-Henry hypothesis has been taken up quite unquestioningly by a number of commentators on 
the GA. See, for example, Witt 1985, 52n.18; Dean-Jones 1994, 186; Mayhew 2004, 43, 45-7, 50; 
Leunissen 2010, 12; Pellegrin 2018; Dean-Jones 2020; for further references see Connell 2016, 173 n.31. 
Carraro initially thinks that GA II.5 ‘looks like a partial revision, or at least refinement’ of Aristotle’s theory 
of generation but cautions later that thinking that the male provides the sentient soul and the female the 
nutritive one ‘overstates the case’ (Carraro 2017, 285-6). 
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(b) If form means sensory soul, this is a highly unusual sense of the concept in Aristotle’s 
biology and philosophy more generally 
(c) The female, on this view, contributes to the form (or contributes ‘part of the form’) and 
so the interpretation is not, after all, a hylomorphic one 
I will address each of these difficulties in turn.  
(a) Nutritive and sentient soul as female and male contributions66 
Proponents of the modified hylomorphic interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of generation posit 
that the exclusive contributions of male and female to generation are of sentient and nutritive 
souls. In de Anima, Aristotle explains that there are ‘separable’ soul capacities; these are 
separable in two senses, either ontologically or conceptually.67 Nutritive and sentient soul are 
conceptually separable because they can be defined without reference to each other. Nutritive 
soul is that which ‘maintains its possessor as such’ (DA II.4, 416b17-19), while sentient soul is 
what ‘receives sensible form without matter’ (DA II.12, 424a18-19; III.2, 427a14-16). Soul 
capacities are ontologically separable if they can exist apart from other soul capacities; nutritive 
soul can do so, but only in plants (DA II.2, 413a31-2, GA I.23, 731a24-26). For plants, nutritive 
soul is not a soul part, but the whole soul (DA I.1, 411b27-30).68 Sentient soul, in contrast, is 
not ontologically separable from nutritive soul.  Those living beings that are sentient, i.e. 
animals, do not have two souls but only one soul with both nutritive and sentient capacities.69 
How, then, would it be possible to separate out these soul functions into male and female 
contributions? One answer might look to embryological development, the nutritive soul being 
 
66 This is a necessary consequence of interpreting the passage as Peck does which is listed as assumption 
(ii) in Section III. 
67 This summary broadly follows Corcilius and Gregoric 2010. 
68 Corcilius and Gregoric 2010, 92. 
69 No living being can have sentient soul without also having nutritive soul (DA II.3, 415a1-2). 
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actualised in an embryo before the sentient faculty.  Aristotle notes at several points that the 
embryo is like a plant (GA II.4, 739b33-740a4; 740a24-28; II.3, 736b13-4).70 This could perhaps 
mean that at this stage it only has nutritive soul; Aristotle also says that it acquires sentient 
soul as it develops (II.3, 736b1-2). There is good reason to believe, however, that there is no 
temporal separation of this kind. Immediately once the embryo becomes viable, and is a living 
being in its own right, it has a heart, the first principle of life (GA II.4, 740a2-4, II.5, 741b16-17). 
The heart is not only a tool of the nutritive soul but also necessary to and the centre of the 
sensory capacities.71 No plant has a heart because the heart is a sentient organ. Thus, an animal 
embryo is never exactly like a plant even if it acts like one by failing to locomote and thus 
needing a ‘root’ to get its nutriment from the mother or egg (GA II.4, 740a24-28). It acquires 
more complex levels and varieties of sensation as it gets more body parts and begins to be able 
to wake up and consciously sense (GA III.2, 753b26-27; V.1, 778b25-779a2). Its ability to sense 
continues to develop when it is born and encounters a different world and different capacities 
of its own (e.g. to locomote and to feel more intense pleasure, pain and desire; DA III.11, 434a2-
4).  The gradual development of levels of perceptual ability is entirely compatible with the first 
actualisation of sentient soul occurring from the very beginning. It seems, then, that sentient 
soul must be present from the very outset and there is no temporal separation between the 
advent of the dual capacities in an animal’s soul. So, female and male’s different contributions 
cannot be found in any time lapse.    
 
70 These passages are noted by Henry 2019, 137 to support his reading. 
71 Nutritive and sentient soul are co-located in the heart (PA II.1, 647a25-27; Somn. 455b34ff.). Once 
nutritive soul has been actualised in the embryo, it is then the principle (archai) of the sequential 
development of the rest of the body parts, including all the sentient parts (GA II.1, 735a, GA II.4, 739b34-
740b9, II.6, 741b25-745b22). 
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Another assumption about the different soul parts coming from male and female is of 
exclusivity: the male contributing only the sentient portion or capacity and the female only the 
nutritive one.  It is very unclear how the male could contribute only sentient soul – since the 
embryo cannot actualise nutritive soul, and draw nourishment to itself (GA II.1, 735a15-16) 
until and unless the female has mated with a male animal.  Thus, the male looks to be 
absolutely necessary to start off not just the sentient soul but also the nutritive soul. The 
supposed implication that the female is in charge of constructing the nutritive capacities is also 
problematic.72 First of all, it is not the case that Aristotle says that the female contribution to 
generation in normal circumstances is to contribute nutritive soul potentially; instead this is 
what he says of the dead-end wind egg, which will never become an animal. Secondly, he does 
not imply, thereby, that the female contribution can only affect nutritive aspects of the 
embryo. The animal never has a nutritive form separable ontologically from sentient form (or 
the sentient ‘part of form’).  
(b) Strictly speaking, the form of an animal is its sentient soul73 
For the Peck-Henry interpretation to remain hylomorphic, it must explain how it is that the 
male contribution of form is now converted to a contribution of ‘sensory soul only’. If, as is 
posited, this is now what Aristotle means by ‘form’, it ought to be acknowledged that this is 
quite a significant change for him and a very different idea of what form is than appears in most 
of his works. Form, as applied to animals, is to be identified most strongly with the soul (PA I.1, 
641a18-19) as opposed to the body as matter. However, form is also the animal’s nature (the 
 
72 ‘Aristotle observes that unfertilized “wind-eggs” never develop to the point where they begin to form 
sense organs, which (he thinks) shows that the father’s contribution must be responsible for the 
development of the sensory system. The fact that wind-eggs develop at all, however, shows that the 
nutritive power of soul comes from the female’ (Henry 2009, 373). 
73 This is an assumption made in the original Peck translation. See note 40 above.  
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source of change and rest in all four categories) and essence (what it is to be that animal) (PA 
I.3, 644a24-5).  The picture we get of an animal’s form, soul, essence and nature from the 
biological works is not significantly distinct from that we get from Aristotle’s more abstract 
treatises and none of them suggest that there ought to (or even could) be a sole focus on 
sentient capacities.74  
One reason given for the sensory soul being form in the ‘most strict sense’ is that ‘it is 
the property that makes a creature an animal (its substantial being)’.75 Here it seems that an 
ambiguity between universal ‘animal’ as ‘substantial being’ and a particular animal’s 
substantial being is being exploited. What would it mean for ‘animal’ to be essential to any 
animal’s substantial being?  As a substance, any animal must necessarily first and foremost be 
an animal, and for this it needs a sensory soul.  But Aristotle rarely talks of an animal’s form in 
that sort of abstract way.  In de Anima, where he details the sensory soul, Aristotle never says 
that it is the essence of any particular animal. It could be an essential property of ‘animal’ taken 
universally, as a definition at that level of abstraction. Animal is a sensing being, for example.76 
But Aristotle is much more focused on particular kinds of animal when he is thinking about 
their forms and not something like ‘the form of animal itself qua animal’. This is all the more 
the case in the generation of animals, where we hear so often that the male animal makes 
another like in form to itself (GA II.1, 734b21-22; 735a18-22), which indicates form taken at 
 
74 There are, of course, many important and lengthy discussions about how the accounts of form and 
essence in both sets of works are related. For excellent treatments, see for example Lennox 1985, 81-82; 
Lennox 1987,  339-359, especially at 356-8; Lloyd 1996, ch.3. 
75 Henry 2006, 295. See also Henry 2004, 196 note 29: ‘it follows from Aristotle’s reproductive 
hylomorphism that an offspring will receive only one movement for the parts of its sensory system (the 
movement “Animal” which comes from the father).’ 
76 See Juv. IV, 469b3-5; GA II.3, 736b1-2 
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species level. Indeed, this is how Aristotle characterises what is so important about the 
generation of animals in his other works as well (GC II.11, 338b7-17, DA II.4, 415a29-b9).  
Within his zoology and in his metaphysical works more generally, Aristotle’s idea of the 
form of an animal is what specific sort of animal it is, for example, a lion. The lion has a certain 
arrangement of organs, put in place by its form or essence, so as to serve its particular kind of 
life (bios).77 The organs of the lion, its stomach, heart, lungs, and the orientation and 
composition of its limbs, are all there so that it can be a lion; these are not divided into nutritive 
and sentient portions of its capacities, although of course some of the organs are for nutrition 
and others for locomotion or sensation. The form of the lion must surely encompass them all. 
And when we consider the soul of the lion, it would be odd to say that what it was to be a lion 
involved only its sensory capacities; surely the lion digests and breathes in a lion-like manner 
as well. Even if we were to concede that conceptually, the lion’s sentient soul had much more 
to do with being a lion than its nutritive soul, it still seems impossible to separate the two 
ontologically, which would have to be possible if one were to come from the male and the 
other from the female.  The nutritive soul in an animal produces blood which goes to make up 
all the parts of the body, including the sentient parts; blood itself, which is manufactured by 
nutritive action, is the carrier of sensory information to the central sense organ (i.e., the heart 
or its analogue). The nutritive soul aims to produce another living being like itself (nutritive soul 
is generative soul): the new animal will be sentient, but this is not brought about by sentient 
soul but by the action of the male animal’s nutritive soul (DA II.4, 415a26-28). A simple example 
illustrates how interwoven these soul capacities are.  The bending of a lion’s legs, which affects 
the way in which it is able to progress, depends on facts about the way it protects and feeds its 
 
77 The soul determines the arrangement of the parts in order to serve the ends of a particular way of life. 
Another example from the zoological works is of predator birds who have feathered wings because 
‘swiftness of flight is useful to their way of life (bios)’ (IA 10, 710a26-27). See especially Lennox 2009. 
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young (IA 12, 711b12-32). Here, the way the body is structured to be a locomotive and sentient 
being, seeking food and mates on foot, is inseparable from the way in which it lactates and thus 
its ‘nutri-generative system’. 
When we also consider the male role in generation and how it is related to form, this 
again does not fit at all well with this form being ‘sensory soul only’.  It makes much better 
sense if, by being the efficient cause of this particular type of change, his contribution were in 
fact ensuring that the whole soul of the animal, nutritive and sentient together, comes to be in 
the unique way it does for his particular kind.78 Something that is already a lion (male parent) 
is making something else a lion.79 Because the male is said to contribute the soul, he also must 
contribute the essence, the ‘what it is to be’ that animal (GA II.4, 738b26-7). But by the analysis 
just conducted, it would seem that this essence includes the whole soul, not only its sensory 
capacities. 
(c) The female, on this view, contributes to the form (or contributes ‘part of the form’)80  
The hylomorphic interpretation is quite explicit that the female animal, according to Aristotle’s 
supposedly more nuanced theory of GA II.5, contributes to the form of the new animal.81  If the 
 
78 See also D. Balme 1972 [1994], 165 notes on 737a33; Gelber 2010, 198-200; Morsink 1982, 118-9. 
79 GA II.1.734a30-31; 734b21-3, 735a21; Cf. Metaph. VII.7, 1032a25, VII.8 1034a35-b8; see Connell 2001, 316. 
80 Gelber is also keen to refute the idea that the female contributes ‘part of the form’ (Gelber 2010, 201). 
81 ‘Most interestingly, Aristotle also reveals in GA II 5 that the mother’s contribution is not confined to 
providing the offspring’s body. She too provides part of its soul.’ (Henry 2006, 295) and later on: ‘However 
neat and tidy the traditional interpretation may be, when we trace Aristotle’s reproductive hylomorphism 
though the GA we find that it clearly does not divide the contributions of mother and father exhaustively 
into matter and form…. nowhere is it stated that the mother does not supply anything formal. Indeed, as 
we have seen, Aristotle makes a case for his as early as Book II by saying that he mother does (or at least 
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theory is to remain significantly hylomorphic, it must attempt to minimize this supposed formal 
role. It attempts to do so in part by emphasising that the sentient soul is more properly an 
animal’s form (see the previous section for my analysis of that proposal). It must also make 
sense of the female being solely responsible for the development of the nutritive soul. On this 
score, there is an attempt to further nuance Aristotle’s supposed refinement. Recognising that 
the nutritive soul can be said to construct the sensory parts of the body and that the soul needs 
to be unified rather than divided between parents, Henry (2009, 374) proposes distinguishing 
between: (1) ‘nutritive soul’ in GA II.4 which is identified with the offspring’s generative nature 
and (2) ‘nutritive soul’ in GA II.5 which comes from the mother.  
(1) is generative soul, which is from both parents  
(2) is the ‘general capacity of a living thing to process nutriment and to increase and 
maintain its size’ which is from the mother alone (Ibid). 
The idea here is that the maternal contribution is not the nutritive soul of the new animal but 
a special sort of truncated nutritive capacity which can only construct nutritive parts or systems 
and cannot construct the sensory parts. As Henry put is: ‘The mother contributes the part that 
governs the development of the metabolic system, while the father contributes the part that 
governs the development of the sensory system’.82 
 
can) supply part of the offspring’s soul.’ (298). In this Henry follows Balme 1987, 305: ‘the female matter 
contributes some formal qualities’. 
82 Henry 2009, 374; 381, n.16. In his book, Henry produces a more nuanced account of how male and 
female contribute the different parts of soul (2019, 138-142). However, the main idea remains in 
place: ‘what the semen possesses is a certain power (dunamis) for generating sensory organs whose 
own developing capacities constitute the sensory part of the future offspring’s soul…. Likewise 
Aristotle argues that the menstrual blood is endowed with a set of spermatic motions in virtue of 
which it transmits the nutritive part of the soul (also as a power for generating the corresponding 
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It is difficult to see how this account could fit with Aristotelian embryogenesis. Aristotle 
nowhere says that the female contribution contains special powers that form the nutritive 
parts only and the male, ones that form the sensory parts only. Even the thought that the 
female contribution is responsible for forming a ‘metabolic system’ and the male for forming a 
‘sensory one’ is pretty difficulty to construct in terms of Aristotelian physiology. Notoriously, 
he has no separate ‘nervous system’ – all nutritive and sentient functions revolve around the 
same heart/heart analogue and blood (Juv. 1, 467b27-32, 2, 468a21-23, 3-4, 468b28-469b7).83  
There does not appear to be a clear separation between nutritive and sensory parts – the blood 
and heart are involved in both and fleshy parts like the mouth are used to masticate but also 
to sense with. With the larger and clearer differences between nutritive and sentient parts (e.g. 
stomach, liver, lungs versus flesh, mouths, ears), these parts don’t seem to have separate lines 
of formation, somehow directed by two causal systems. There is certainly no temporal 
difference in formation, as noted above: the head and eyes and other upper parts come to be 
before the lower parts (with stomach and intestines, GA II.6, 742b14-15); flesh, the primary 
sense organ, is among the first parts to form in the foetus (743b3-5). If, as is posited, the female 
 
system of organs)’ (141). ‘On the interpretation developed here, what the father transmits in his 
semen are a series of motions whose function is to endow the embryo with a set of active powers 
(dunameis) for forming sensory organs, while those from the mother include active power for 
developing parts of the nutritive system. The developed capacities (or first-actualities) of those 
different physiological systems constitute the sensory and nutritive parts of the offspring’s soul 
respectively’ (Henry 2019, 159-160).    
83 The final nourishment is perfected in the heart (Juv. 3, 469a5). Development of all the body parts, a nutri-
generative function, is directed from the heart, in the embryo (GA II.6, 742b30-743a1). Sensory information 
travels to the heart from the sense organs and the images are preserved in the blood (Juv. 1-4, Mem.1). 
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contribution of wind eggs ‘never develop to the point where they begin to form sense organs’,84 
we would expect to see a stomach or other such ‘nutritive’ parts in the wind egg, which of 
course we do not. 
A complete refutation of the view that the female ensures the formation of nutritive 
systems and the male sensory ones would take far too long. However, we can now see what a 
very radical theory this would be, given the rest of Aristotle’s embryology. Thus, if an 
alternative interpretation of GA II.5 can be offered that would not require such intricate 
complications, this would be preferable.  
V. Conclusions:  Hylomorphism or Archêkineticism? 
Retaining a focus on Aristotle’s theory of generation as ‘reproductive hylomorphism’ 
leads to many difficulties that can be distracting when trying to understand Aristotle’s theory 
of the differentiated roles of male and female as part of form/soul, as the previous section 
detailed. Why, given these complications, have some found it so important to retain the 
hylomorphic framework as the main way to structure analysis of Aristotle’s theory of 
generation? This must be because it is perceived to allow for a continuity with discussions of 
abstract substantial generation in the rest of the Corpus (e.g. GC, Metaphysics Z).85 This is, then, 
to some extent, a way to read Aristotle’s biology in the hope that it will illuminate metaphysical 
problems found elsewhere in his works.86 But rather than viewing Aristotle as trying to fit 
 
84 Henry 2009, 373. 
85 Henry 2019, 14: ‘The basic argument of this book is that Aristotle employs a single model of generation 
throughout the corpus – the hylomorphic model’. 
86 ‘The philosophical issues examined in relation to biology, then, are already determined by reference to 
other nonbiological texts. After the problems arising in more canonical texts have been clarified, the 




animal generation into a rigid matter / form dichotomy, it is better to acknowledge more fully 
how his account of the intricacies of the most complicated natural phenomenon, animal 
generation, brings about a different emphasis. Souls are dynamic and interconnected; male 
and female animals both have souls which work together to bring about the gradual 
development of embryo and do not seem to divide tasks between soul functions.87  
Thinking of Aristotle’s theory of generation as archêkinetic explains the content of GA 
in a more interrelational manner. Let’s consider again wind eggs in GA II.5.  If we are not 
focused on the contrast of form and matter, then there is no need to infer from what is said 
about them that the female provides part of form. Instead these eggs indicate the complexity 
of matter (ὕλη).88 The fact that a wind egg rots (II.5, 741a23) shows that it has already been 
undergoing a living process – not as a living being in its own right, but as the nutritive residue 
of the female animal. In GA II.3 Aristotle says explicitly that the generative products of male 
and female animals are not soulless (736a32-35).89 Wind eggs show that the female is able to 
generate ‘up to a point’ (GA I.21, 730a31; II.5, 741a18; III7, 757b15); the agency in both 
passages is assigned to the female or, rather, to the nutritive soul of the female.  As indicated 
earlier, the wind egg is unlike the female contribution to generation when it is successful, 
because it has passed the point at which it could become a viable animal. But the wind egg and 
the passage about the need for the male in GA 2.5 can tell us more about the female 
contribution as the contribution of the nutritive residue of the female animal, brought into 
existence by the agency of her nutritive soul.   
 
87 Henry’s account of male and female roles is much improved by considering the potential for change in 
the generative residues and the gradual development of the embryo, although the focus is still on 
sentient as opposed to nutritive potentials (Henry 2019, ch.5). 
88 Gelber 2010, 201; Connell 2016, 156, 160; 2001, 319-22. 
89 This is a difficult passage, because Aristotle doesn’t make clear if the kuêmata are fertilised or 
unfertilised generative products. For an analysis of this issue see De Ribera-Martin 2019, 119-120.  
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The female contribution to generation is the most concocted portion of blood, which 
is the female’s attempt to generate another like itself. It also contains dunameis (‘powers’) that 
strive to generate a female resembling herself and her family (GA IV.3, 767b33-768a9, 768a10-
21). A wind egg develops beyond the usual female contribution, indicating how interaction 
between male and female contributions can happen after conception (as in GA IV.1-4). This is 
why it has soul in some sense and is not completely inanimate, like a ‘dead eye’ (GA II.1, 735a8). 
The female contribution is moving toward becoming a sentient being, as effected by the agency 
of the female animal’s nutritive soul. It is in a state of transition, similar to the one that the 
male contribution to generation is in as it conveys living qualities of the animal from the male’s 
nutritive soul to the female’s materials.90 The female’s materials are not only passive to that 
action; they are brought into being by the female’s nutritive soul and so also conveying living 
qualities. It is only during a short time that these bodily fluids will retain these capacities, since 
like blood, they will eventually cool down and lose them, particularly if they are no longer in 
the right place at the right time. Semen and menstrual blood that exit the body without having 
formed a viable fetation are merely waste products (GA II.4, 738a27-30; HA IX(VII).1, 581b29-
33). However, we have learnt that the female contribution, before it exits and when it still has 
the potential to meet with the male contribution, is moving toward becoming a sentient being. 
The female cannot bring this about, because of an incapacity in her nutri-generative function; 
but she is not thereby attempting to produce a plant; her residue must be moving toward a 
being like in kind to herself, i.e. some kind of animal.  It is wrongheaded to say, then, that the 
female role can be defined in terms of contributing ‘only nutritive soul potentially’ (which is 
 
90 ‘[T]he semen is said to be actually changing – because in order for it to convey the change that comes 
from the father’s soul, it must itself be changing in that direction, just as the tool that heats another 
object must itself be heating up’, Connell 2016, 178. I here explain how it is that the nutritive soul is an 
‘unchanged changer’ as described in Ph. III.5, 256b13-20. See also Connell forthcoming. 
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said of the wind egg).91 Furthermore, the male role is not to ‘provide’ sentient soul. It is much 
more accurate to say that the male simultaneously establishes the beginning of the 
development of the intertwined and co-dependent nutritive and sentient aspects of the soul 
of the particular kind. The female cannot complete the generation of ‘this sort of soul’ because 
it is an animal soul, which is both nutritive and sentient together.  
Scholars of Aristotle’s Generation of Animals need to abandon Peck’s translation of GA 
II.5 741a6-741b9 and reject the idea that sentient soul is strictly speaking the form. Instead the 
form Aristotle is referring to in his embryology is the form of the kind, passed through the 
action by the male from one generation to the next. One might think the interpretation offered 
here takes away the concession that Aristotle makes to the female role: that it is also ‘part of 
the form’, i.e. nutritive soul, which it exclusively contributes. However, the alternative 
interpretation is inaccurate and distorts his theory. And furthermore, it does not help us 
understand the complexity of the female role in generation for Aristotle because while it gives 
her the ability to produce nutritive soul, it takes away any influence on sentient soul. Aristotle 
does not divide soul parts between the sexes; instead he defines them in terms of 
ability/inability and action/passion. The male initiates both soul parts and the female 
contribution is potentially able to become an animal body that facilitates both soul parts – both 
are in both – one as potential and one as the capacity to actualise. There is, then, no need to 
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